University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Honors Theses

Student Research

Spring 1941

The reflection of the United States Steel
Corporation in America's industrial drama
Ethne Flanagan

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/honors-theses
Recommended Citation
Flanagan, Ethne, "The reflection of the United States Steel Corporation in America's industrial drama" (1941). Honors Theses. Paper
287.

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

THE REFLECTION OF THE UNITED STATES STEEL
CORPORATION IN AMERICA'S INDUSTRIAL DRAMA

Ethne Flanagan
.May, 1941

THE REFLECTION OF THE UNITED STATES STEEL
CORPORATION IN AMERICA'S INDUSTRIAL DRAMA
We need only to open our eyes and cast a glance about us to recognize that our modern twentieth century life is girded with steel.
Steel is the very key product of the present era of the evolution of
man.

In the beginning it was stone, then bronze, and then iron, but

today it is steel which conditions the industrialized political, economic, and social life of our country.
When we consider the reflection of the United States Steel
Corporation in America's industrial drama, we cannot help but notice
the ideal stage setting in which steel unfolds its plot at the beginning of this century.

No industry has had brighter prospects to

advance than those the steel industry had at that time.
The years sice the Civil War have covered the greatest progress
the world has ever known.

Before the Civil War, there was no such

thing as the steel industry in America.

"The trifling production of

blister steel, amounting to a few thousand tons per year, was not worthy of that designation, but the iron business had already laid the
foundations of its future greatness, and this in spite of the fact
that we had then comparatively no ores, no efficient fuel, no adequate
machinery and very little of the practical and scientific knowledge
so widely diffused today. 111 .
1

Butler, Fifty Years of Iron and Steel, p. 2.

The Civil War created ·an immediate demand for iron and steel.
As in many other fields, it furnished the impetus for new. inventions
which speeded up the industrialization of America.

In the steel

field, many new furnaces were erected, every method of increasing
production was eagerly seized, and from that time forward the growth
of the steel industries has been phenomenal.
In reviewing the developments which have made the steel industry,
and Ultimately the United States Steel Corporation, the most important
cog in the national industrial machine, it is logical for us to discuss
first the inventions which were stimulated by the Civil War and which
have, in turn, stimulated the advancement of the American Steel Industcy.
"Technically steel is, broadly interpreted, refined iron.

His-

torically, iron has been manufactured for thousands of years, while
the purification processes of iron, making possible mass production
of steel in its modern sense, were invented first in the latter half
of the last century. 112 These processes which have each served to
revolutionize the steel industry and to change the industrial map of
the world, as well, are in chronological sequence, the Bessemer,
Open Hearth, and Electric processes.
The invention of the Bessemer process by Sir Henry Bessemer in
1855 is generally regarded as the longest single step in the march of
progress which ·has brought the iron and steel industries to their
present stage.

However, this process gave a distinct advantage to

those countries possessing high-grade iron ores which are necessary
for satisfactory use in a Bessemer converter.
2

The limitations of the

Sundblad, the American Steel Industry, p. 7.

ment of the by-products industry on the formation of the United States
Steel Corporation and on the importance of steel in the American industrial cavalcade, we must consider the tremendous influence of the
Lake Superior ore deposits on the industry.
"]here is no question that from the time of the discovery of the
Mesaba Range, civilization and progress received a tremendous impulse
from the cheaper iron and steel it made possible, 11 4
time~furnaces

Previous to that

had been located only where the ore and fuel could be

found, but with the growing demand for steel, caused by the growing
expansion of the country by rail, etc,, such resources were inadequate,
and it became apparent that mass production of these commodities was
nece~sary

to profitable operation.

In other words, here again, we

find argument for the consolidation of steel industries into profitable
corporations such as the United States Steel Corporation.
No story of any aspect of steel would be complete without some
mention of the role that the tariff has played in its almost mushroom
growth.

From the very beginning, the steel industry has labored and

lobbied continuously in Congress for the maintenance of a high protective tariff, andJfor the most.partJsteel has been successful,

Steel

industries have organized grandiloquent propaganda campaigns in an
attempt to educate (or illusion) the public and the authorities to
the realization that the struggling iron and steel industries could
not operate against competition from abroad unless they were protected
by a high tariff wall,

Tru~,

the young indUstries needed protection

but not to the extent that they received it, especially from Republican Congresses.

However, the protective tariff served to accelerate

4 Butler, 2£.• cit., p. 54.

the development of the United States Steel Corporation in America's
industrial drama.
"When Bessemer, by the invention of his converter, made possible
the production of cheap steal rapidly and on an enormous scale, he
started a rush into the business of steel making which was as wild and
fierce, in its way, as the rush of the prospector and the miner into
a newly discovered gold field."5

The industry expanded by leaps and

bounds and .the one guiding motive of the iron-master was production,
the turning out of a maximmn amotmt of tonnage.

It made no difference

by what mscrupulous methods the tonnage was produced, and, as a re-

sult, fierce competition was rampant.

The underlying principle of

production seems to have been "cut-throat" competition, a case of
"dog eat

dog~111

Because of all the price-cutting, unfair methods of business, and
the evils attendant upon the desire to secure markets, the more
thoughtful and far-seeing.industrialists tried to find some degree of
stability in the famous ."pools, 11 ineffective contracts and agreements
drawn up with the purpose of realizing some sort of understanding or
cooperation in distributing and selling the evergrowing output of
competing furnaces and rolling mills.
Out of all this destructive competition emerged a man who.recognized the serious disadvantages under which the steel trade in the
United States was laboring.

This man was Andrew Carnegie who, with

his organizing genius and ability, was able to build up a vast aggre5 Walker, The Story of Steel, p. 156.

gation of furnaces and rolling mills, coke ovens and so forth, which
made him tower like a giant among his competitors •.

He consolidated

several of the more important concerns into one great corporation
because of his economies, he became

11

and~

the most.powerful agent in carry-

the steel trade of the United States up to the commanding position!
which it had attained at the close of his active career."6 However,
Carnegie's business policies also rested on ruthless competition.
During the decade which preceded the emergence of the United
States Steel Corporation, in addition to the unsuccessful "pools,"
there developed a vertical and a lateral process of combination in
the steel industry to meet the problems presented by an industrial
America.

The v'ertlcal process of combination eimbodied the integrating

of tpe successive stages of production from iron mine to rolling mill,
and was justified in that materials could thus be handled more economically.

The lateral process of combination which provided for the

consolidation of companies which made the same finished products, was
justified on the ground that each mill or plant would be allowed to
specialize in certain products and so could effect economies in production.
The formation of the United States Steel Corporation in 1901
employed both these movements of integration and combination and set
up an establishment which then embraced 60 per cent of the steel industry.

"It brought together several of the most powerful integrated

companies and also the chief combinations of manufacturers which had
formerly competed in the
sheets, and tin plate.

sa~e

of finished products--such as\wire;, tubes,

It acquired, then and subsequently, large

holdings in the Lake Superior ore properties.
6

Ibid, p. 157.

It obtained extensive

deposits of high-grade coking coal in the Connellsville und the West
Virginia regions.

It got possession of several railroads especially

adapted to the transportation of iron."7

In short, it became a

thoroughly integrated concern and, in 1926, controlled 40 per cent of
the country's capacity for steel production.
The credit for the foundation of the United States Steel Corporation has been placed upon the person of Judge Elbert H. Gary, who
was the

pre~ident

of that concern from 1905 to 1927.

Gary, believing that the destructive competition of the day wus a
serious threat to the full development of the United States steel
industry, was attempting to amalgamate into one giant corporation
several large steel properties.

He first solicited the aid of J. P.

Morgan, then the only man in America who could influence the necessary
capital, but Morgan was unresponsive and nothing was done.

Fortunately,

however, for the United States Steel Corporation, Carnegie was ready
at this time to sell out his interests and retire •.
At a dinner in New York on December 12, 1900, to v1hich Mr. Morgan
was invited, the mater of the acquisition of the vast Carnegie plants
~

and the need for capital was discussed.

After the enthusiastic un-

folding by Charles M. Schwab, then president of Carnegie Steel Company,
of the benefits to be derived from the amalgamation, Morgan agreed to
put up the necessary capital.

Carnegie's properties were acquired at

the price of $305,450,000 in bonds and $188,556,160 in stock of the
new corporation, and the United States Steel Corporation, chartered
on February 25, 1901, began.business with twelve of the largest companies then in existence.
7

Ibid, p. 192.

Since its chartering, the United States Steel Corporation has
become one of the most powerful forces in America's industrial drama.
The expansion of the corporation has been phenomenal and reflects the
expansion of the other industries which have aided in industrializing
the American scene.

In considering the expansion of the steel industry, we must analyse
the growing consumption of steel in order to obtain a clearer picture
of the ca uses of steel's great development.
In 1925, the railroads were among the chief consumers of steel,
but 1 since that yearJ their consumption h!is declined.

However, over a

period of years, the railroads may be expected to take a quarter of
the steel output.
The percentage of steel produced which the building and construetion industry has taken is increasing.
Oil, gas, and water companies have become increasingly less important, but the automobile industry has steadily increased its consumption of steel products.

In 1921 the automobile industry used less

than 5 per cent of the total sheet products shipped, in 1926 they used
nearly 15 percent, and today they are using far more.

The table op-

posite gives one a fair idea of the relative consumption of steel products.
The United States Steel Corporation has followed the policy of
expanding out of earnings, more than has any other corporation.
fact

'

In

in the first 25 years of its existence it turned back over 41
.

per cent of its net income into the business, according to the fol-

lowing figures:
(April 1, 1901, to December 51, 1925)8
Balance of profits available for dividends
Dividends paid on preferred and common stock
Earnings left in business

<1-.
•
w2,185,712,405
1,279,253,785
$ 906,458,618

for capital expenditures and
special charges
Capital surplus at date of organization
Total surplus, December 51, 1924

$409,595,509
.25,000,000

Approp~iated

~521,865,109

. One of-the most interesting aspects of the reflection of the
United States Steel Corporation in America's industrial drama has been
its relation to labor.

The relation to

l~bor

reflects,in many ways>

th1relation to labor of other industries in America's industrial drama.
FOrtunately, however, the United States Steel Corporation hns been
manned with leadership, progressive or clever enough, to appease, at
the psychological moment, the demands of labor which other industries
have failed to do anc thus have had their development, to a certain
degree, stifled.
Because the steel industry is a continous and relatively a dangerous industry, it has presented to our industrial society one of its
biggest labor problems.

According to the United States Bureau of

Labor Statistics, about 40 per cent of the employees in the iron and
steel industry in 1910 were working 72 or more hours per week, that
is, for 12 hours a day, for 6 days in the week, and about 20 per .. cent
were working 84 hours a week, that is, for 12 hours a day for all

7 days in the week.
8

Ibid, p. 202.

Despite these excessive hours of work, as well as

low wages, the United States Steel Corporation did not recognize an
outside union until January, 1957,
When the United States Steel Corporation was organized in 1901,
the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers made a
slight effort to unionize the workers, but it was only u gesture.
Squelched by fears of company finks-detectives-with which every steel
plant wus infested, the forces of unrest remained quiet until the
.sumn;_er of

1~18,

when the United States was at war.

At that time,

urged on by the impact of pressure from within the ranks, the American
Federation of Labor formed the National Committee for Organizing Iron
and Steel Workers.
The

receptio~

wanted a union.

of the movement proved at once that steel workers

Not only did they sign unioncards by the thousand,

but they even paid their dues in advance.

Inside a weekJmore than

three thousand had joined and their demands had been formulated at.
meetings.

The demands of the steel workers reflected, in large part,

the agitation of labor in the whole of:Ariierica's industrial drama and
chief among the demands were the eight-hour day, the right to join a
union, one day's rest in seven,. and higher wages.
Gary, choosing as always the clever and most practical way out,
displayed his generalship by issuing an order that granted the eighthour day, with time and one-half for overtime, effective in all plants
of the United States Steel Corporation.

For a time, Gary's decision

served to sap strength from the budding union, but only for a time.
In September, 1919, after Gary had refused to negotiate with

Gompers, head of the A. F. of L., the strike call went out and by
September 50, a week after the strike call, the shutdown was almost
complete with approximately 565,000 men out of the mills and blast
furnaces.

However, the strike was completely one-sided.

Amalgamated

had no treasury and the A. F. of L. international unions were doing
nothing to help.

Judge Gary, ingenious leader th<1t he was, held his·

peace and won the struggle.
and

Steel workers went back to their jobs

decision of United States Supreme Court, handed down on March 1,

R

o9

1920, sustained thatAthe:District Court of the United States for the
district of New Jersy, in which a petition for the dissolution of the
United States Steel Corporation was refused.
11

The 1919 steel strike

na9 been the biggest industrial upheaval the country had ever known."9

It had served as a prologue to the more audible part which labor was
destined to play in America's industrial scene.
From 1922 to.l929, due either to the wages of common labor getting
tcohigh to suit the steel companies or due to the shortage of lubor,
steel companies began to import Mexicans, many of v·Ihorn arrived jU£t in
time for the Crash of '29.

However, during these post-war years, con-

ditions in the steel industry steadily improved, and, in 1'323, President
Harding intervened in behalf of the steel workers with the result that the
eight-hour day was finally established.

Many fancy titles have been given

to this post-war era in which for the first time to the consciousness
of America came the realization that a new policy of mass production had
gradually produced revolutionary changes in our economic and social standards.

This era has been called

11

the second industrial revolution,"

9 .Holbrook, Iron Brew, p. 520.

"Fordism," etc., but, rather than being a revolution, it has simply been
a part of the natural evolution of an industrial America, as we have seen
by following the formation and development of the United States Steel
Corporation since the Civil War.
As more and more historians are beginning to realize 1 the stock
market crash of 1929 marks the threashold of a new era for the nation,
both in its industrial life proper and in its attitude toward the industrial drama of America.

"The forces of depression made the country

mindful of the necessity of more enlightened industrial philosophy,nlO
and, since the crash, labor has steadily moved to a more favorable position in the steel ·industry.
of

Jndustria~gnates

However, the clash between the old school

and the school of industrial progressivism has become

in the 1950's a clash between the old school and President Roosevelt's
liberal movement.
Under the New Deal, such acts as the National Recovery Administration and the Wagner National Labor Relations Act

h~ve

attempted to legis-

late for the betterment of labor in our industrial society.

In addition,

it cannot be denied that it was the New Deal rather than the kindness
of the soul of the United States Steel Corporation (as that corporation's
pamphlets would lead us to believe) which caused such

a

sensational

decision of that corporation.
In 1957, in the face of a strongly organized steel union of 150

lodges with more than 125,000 paid-up members, the United States Steel
Corporation announced that it had recognized and was ready to deal with
theCC. I. 0.

However sensational the decision·of the United States

Steel Corporation nto recognize for the first time in Big Steel's history
an outside union may seem (especially since it, sensing Mr. Roosevelt's
10

Sundblad, EE·

ill·,

p. 12.

friendly attitude toward labor, had tried valiantly to appease the demands of labor with a company union), it is)in reality 1 a mere link in a
chain of prerequisites; absolutely essential for the advancement of the
steel industry to a point where it can assume its full share of the responsibilities owed the nation."ll
We

h~ve

watched the almost phenomenal development of the United

States Steel Corporation in our industrial drama.

From its simple fun-

.damantal beginnings after the Civil War we have seen it rise to its full
stature and grasp tenaciously the soul of an industrial society.

We

have watched it manipulate the tariff, struggle with labor, etc., maintaining always its monopolistic, powerful position in industry.
Today, with the world in another chaotic state, even worse than that
of 1914, our country is again keyed to the maximum of its industrial production.

The United States Steel Corporation and all steel have become

the center of attraction on our industrial stage.
We cannot say now whether or not the Corporation will accept the
social responsibility placed upon it by this crisis.

However, we re-

cognize that,in the past,the Unites States Steel Corporation has been
sharply reflected in America's industrial drama, and we may expect its
reflection to grow even sharper during these critical years before us.
Previously, the Corporation has been both the glory and the shame of
industrial America.

For the future, we can only hope that such a power-

ful force as the United States Steel Corporation may reflect the spirit
of social progressivism in America's industrial drama.
ll Ibid, p. 16.
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